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 Equality at Stake: Connecting the Privacy/Vulnerability Cycle 
to the Debate about Publicly Accessible Online Court Records 
 
By Jacquelyn Burkell and Jane Bailey** 
 
A considerable amount has been written about the privacy implications of publishing court and 
tribunal records online. In this article the authors examine the linkages between privacy and 
vulnerability for members of marginalized communities and, drawing on Calo’s “vicious cycle” 
of privacy and vulnerability, suggest that publicly accessible online court records represent an 
equality issue as well. Drawing on social science research and privacy theory, the authors 
demonstrate the potentially disproportionate effect of online court records on members of 
marginalized communities. They then examine Canadian case law, legislation and policy that 
impose restrictions on public disclosure of information from court proceedings and disclosure of 
information within court proceedings to highlight a limited pre-existing recognition of the 
privacy/vulnerability cycle. In conclusion they suggest that removal of personal information from 
court records made publicly available online would serve to protect both privacy and equality 
rights.   
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 [T]he more information you have about a person or group, the greater the potential to 
take advantage of them. The fewer advantages a person or group already enjoys, the 
lesser their ability to resist expectations and requirements of turning over information in 
exchange for support. The result is a vicious cycle which bears great exploration and may 
militate in favor of stronger privacy protections for the chronically vulnerable. 
Ryan Calo1 
 
I. Introduction  
Court and tribunal records from around the world are increasingly publicly accessible online. 
These initiatives offer, as we and others have noted, ground-shifting opportunities for improved 
access to justice and for the transparency of court proceedings; however, they simultaneously 
raise serious privacy issues for those involved, willingly or unwillingly, in those proceedings.2 In 
this article we explore the complex and iterative relationship, characterized in the epigraph by 
Calo, between publicly accessible, unredacted, online court records and marginalization, 
vulnerability and inequality. Specifically, we suggest that members of equality-seeking 
communities stand to be disproportionately negatively affected by online publication of court 
records incorporating personal information. In this way, online court records constitute not only a 
privacy problem, but an equality problem as well. This further dimension adds urgency to the 
need for privacy and equality-respecting approaches to online publication of court and tribunal 
records. 
 We advance our argument in Parts II and III. Part II examines literature and social 
science evidence relating to privacy and vulnerability, suggesting that members of marginalized 
                                                        
1 Ryan Calo, “Privacy, Vulnerability, and Affordance” (2017) 66:2 DePaul Law Review 591 at 597. 
2 Jane Bailey & Jacquelyn Burkell, “Revisiting the Open Court Principle in an Era of Online Publication: 
Questioning Presumptive Public Access to Parties’ and Witnesses’ Personal Information” (2017) 48:1 
Ottawa Law Review 147; Natalie A MacDonnell, “Disability Disclosure in the Digital Age: Why the 
Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario Should Reform its Approach to Anonymized Decisions” (2016) 25:1 
Journal of Law and Social Policy 109; Karen Eltis, Courts, Litigants and the Digital Age: Law, Ethics and 
Practice (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2012) at 5.  
 communities in Canada, including poor and homeless persons, those suffering from mental 
illness, racialized minorities and Indigenous peoples, will be disproportionately negatively 
affected by publicly accessible online court records. Drawing on Calo’s “vicious cycle” analogy, 
we offer three reasons in support of this assertion: (i) members of certain marginalized 
communities are over-represented in many types of court proceedings; (ii) the impacts of 
marginalization may force members of these communities to engage with the justice system; and 
(iii) potentially stigmatizing information about these individuals in court records renders them 
vulnerable to increased discrimination and other kinds of harms. Part III looks at the degree to 
which Canadian law has recognized and responded to the privacy/vulnerability cycle in relation 
to court and tribunal records. After examining court rulings about publication bans and rules 
relating to disclosure within proceedings, this section specifically examines privacy protections 
afforded to certain vulnerable groups, including children, sexual assault complainants (who are 
disproportionately likely to be women) and persons with disabilities, as well as public 
commentary relating to online publication of court records.  Some of these decisions and 
commentators implicitly or explicitly recognize the privacy/vulnerability cycle that connects a 
lack of privacy with exposure to inequality and discrimination, thereby offering at least some 
analysis that can be used to support removing personal information from publicly accessible 
online court records. The conclusion recommends a response that disrupts the “vicious cycle” 
without presuming or suggesting that members of equality-seeking communities must or ought to 
conceal certain information about themselves. 
 
II. Examination of the Privacy/Vulnerability Cycle in the Literature  
Jeffrey Rosen, in The Unwanted Gaze, noted that “[t]he ideal of privacy … insists that individuals 
should be allowed to define themselves, and to decide how much of themselves to reveal or 
 conceal in different situations”.3 Rosen’s remarks are echoed in Nissenbaum’s concept of 
information privacy as “contextual integrity”.4 According to Nissenbaum, privacy violations 
occur when personal information is used in ways that are incompatible with norms of appropriate 
use and appropriate distribution.5 The ability to control the use and dissemination of information 
about oneself is important. Intimate relationships depend on a delicate interplay between 
concealment and disclosure.6 Privacy offers us personal autonomy, and supports important social 
values including democracy.7 While it can and has been used to shield abuse of members of 
equality-seeking groups from public scrutiny and censure,8 it can also afford members of 
equality-seeking groups, including women, opportunities for “replenishing solitude and 
independent decision making,” as well as freedom from censure, surveillance and pressures of 
conformity.9 Everyone, including members of equality-seeking groups, needs – and deserves – 
privacy.  
 
A. Privacy and Vulnerability 
Nonetheless, there are many cases in which privacy is closely, and negatively, tied to 
vulnerability and marginalization. Economic marginalization and lack of privacy go hand in hand. 
Some have argued that privacy is becoming a “luxury good”,10 available primarily to those who 
                                                        
3 Jeffrey Rosen, The Unwanted Gaze: The Destruction of Privacy in America (New York: Vintage Books, 
2000) at 223.  
4 Helen Nissenbaum, “Privacy as Contextual Integrity” (2004) 79:1 Washington Law Review 119. 
5 Ibid at 125. 
6 Sandra Petronio & Irwin Altman, Boundaries of Privacy: Dialectics of Disclosure (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 2002). 
7 Nissenbaum, supra note 4 at 128-29. 
8 Catharine MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 
1989) at 191. 
9 Anita L Allen, Uneasy Access: Privacy for Women in a Free Society (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 
1988) at 1183. See also Patricia J Williams, The Alchemy of Race and Rights: Diary of a Law Professor 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991) at 164-65 
10 Julia Angwin, “Has Privacy Become a Luxury Good?”, The New York Times (3 March 2014), online: NY 
Times <www.nytimes.com/2014/03/04/opinion/has-privacy-become-a-luxury-good.html>. 
 can afford to pay to achieve it.11 This is particularly true online, where ‘free’ services are in fact 
purchased with the currency of personal information, and the price of freedom from online 
surveillance is paid in cash – either by use of services hidden behind “paywalls”, or through the 
purchase of privacy-protecting technologies and software. Those living in poverty can afford 
neither, and as a result cannot benefit from the privacy protection that these purchases support. In 
the United States, many have argued that Fourth Amendment protection is reduced for the poor,12 
specifically because they are less able to afford to buy homes.13 Although the issue has not been 
widely addressed in Canada, some empirical research suggests that homeless people’s contacts 
with law often involve invasion of their section 8 rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms.14 These individuals are vulnerable to arbitrary search and seizure because they 
lack a prototypical ‘home’ within which they would be presumed to have an expectation of 
privacy. Technological advances in surveillance may further erode the privacy of those living in 
poverty.15 GPS tracking technologies, for example, are more easily deployed against the urban 
poor, since their vehicles are more likely than those of wealthier citizens to be parked in a public 
location and thus be accessible for the placement of the devices.16 Poverty, then, leads to 
conditions in which privacy is more difficult to attain, or easier to invade. 
                                                        
11 Michael Rosenberg, “The Price of Privacy: How Access to Digital Privacy is Slowly Becoming Divided 
by Class” (2016) 20:1 UCLA Journal of Law and Technology 1. 
12 John Berry, “Nowhere to Hide: How the Judiciary’s Acceptance of Warrantless GPS Tracking 
Eliminates the Practical and Legal Privacy Enjoyed by the Poor”, Social Science Research Network (2011), 
online: SSRN <https://ssrn.com/abstract=1949387>; Christopher Slobogin, “The Poverty Exception to the 
Fourth Amendment” (2003) 55:1 Florida Law Review 391; Kami Chavis Simmons, “Future of the Fourth 
Amendment: The Problem with Privacy, Poverty and Policing” (2014) 14:2 University of Maryland Law 
Journal of Race, Religion, Gender & Class 240. 
13 See Justin Stec, “Why the Homeless are Denied Personhood Under the Law: Toward Contextualizing the 
Reasonableness Standard in Search and Seizure Jurisprudence” (2006) 3:2 Rutgers Journal of Law & 
Urban Policy 321; Mark A Godsey, “Privacy and the Growing Plight of the Homeless: Reconsidering the 
Values Underlying the Fourth Amendment” (1992) 53:3 Ohio State Law Journal 869. 
14 Carol Kauppi & Henri Pallard, “Homeless People and the Police: Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 
and Arbitrary Detentions and Arrests” (2009) 1:6 Conference of the International Journal of Arts and 
Sciences 344, online: Open Access Library <openaccesslibrary.org/images/MAL231_Henri_Pallard.pdf>. 
15 Amelia L Diedrich, “Secure in Their Yards? Curtilage, Technology, and the Aggravation of the Poverty 
Exception to the Fourth Amendment” (2011) 39:1 Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 297. 
16 Berry, supra note 12. 
 The privacy of members of vulnerable communities can be, and is, compromised by 
surveillance directed toward those communities. Surveillance of welfare recipients has in some 
cases been justified on the basis that they are receiving assistance from the state,17 but others have 
argued that this surveillance most significantly affects single, racialized mothers.18 In the United 
States, many jurisdictions require welfare recipients to undergo government mandated drug 
testing.19 Techniques of public health screening and surveillance are also selectively directed 
towards vulnerable members of society. One example is a drug-screening program for pregnant 
women, enacted by the Medical University of South Carolina in the late 1980’s.20 The program, 
designed to reduce the impact of prenatal cocaine use on fetuses, was directed specifically toward 
women who had not obtained prenatal care and those with a previous history of drug or alcohol 
abuse. If the woman tested positive, the results were turned over to the police, and the woman 
was threatened with prosecution in order to force her into treatment. A great deal has been written 
about the legality of the program, along with analyses of the US Supreme Court decision that 
determined that the testing violated Fourth Amendment rights.21 For our purposes, however, the 
fact that this program was ruled unconstitutional is less relevant than the fact that the testing, and 
the negative effects emanating from it, were highly discriminatory, affecting primarily low-
income and racialized women. This is just one of many examples where surveillance is directed at 
vulnerable populations, with predictable and often negative results.  
                                                        
17 Mike Dee, “Welfare Surveillance, Income Management and New Paternalism in Australia” (2013) 11:3 
Surveillance & Society 272; Krystle Maki “Neoliberal Deviants and Surveillance: Welfare Recipients 
Under the Watchful Eye of Ontario Works” (2011) 9:1/2 Surveillance & Society 47; Paul Henman & Greg 
Marston, “The Social Division of Welfare Surveillance” (2008) 37:2 Journal of Social Policy 187. 
18 John Gilliom, The Overseers of the Poor: Surveillance, Resistance, and the Limits of Privacy (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2001).  
19 Celia Goetzl, “Government Mandated Drug Testing for Welfare Recipients: Special Need or 
Unconstitutional Condition?” (2013) 15:5 University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law 1539. 
20 Lawrence O Gostin, “The Rights of Pregnant Women: The Supreme Court and Drug Testing” (2001) 
31:5 Hastings Centre Report 8. See also Kristina B Wolff, “Panic in the ER: Maternal Drug Use, the Right 
to Bodily Integrity, Privacy, and Informed Consent” (2011) 39:5 Politics & Policy 679. 
21 See e.g. Andrew E Taslitz, “A Feminist Fourth Amendment? Consent, Care, Privacy, and Social 
Meaning in Ferguson v. City of Charleston” (2002) 9:1 Duke Journal of Gender Law & Policy 1. 
  There exist myriad examples of selective use of privacy-compromising technologies by 
police against members of marginalized communities. In Canada, DNA technology and 
“voluntary” DNA collection programs have been deployed in the context of law enforcement 
initiatives relating to violence against Indigenous women and girls. These include an initiative 
involving the collection of DNA and other personal information from women (often Indigenous 
women) engaged in what have been termed “vulnerable lifestyles”, as well as an initiative 
involving the collection of DNA from men living in a remote First Nations community that was 
the site of the violent death of a young girl.22 Police stops of racialized youth, particularly young 
men, are so common that the phrase “driving while black” has become part of the public 
lexicon.23 For example, recent data from Ottawa indicate that police there are disproportionately 
likely to target Middle Eastern and black drivers for “random” traffic stops.24 
Not only do conditions of marginalization – e.g. poverty – make people more vulnerable 
to privacy intrusions; privacy intrusions have the potential to increase the effects of 
marginalization. As Kimberly Bailey points out, “because privacy makes an individual less 
vulnerable to oppressive state social control, the deprivation of privacy can be an important 
aspect of one’s subordination”.25 Michele Estrin Gilman makes a similar point about the impact 
of privacy intrusions (in this case, on the poor), suggesting that “the poor as a group suffer 
                                                        
22 Jane Bailey & Sara Shayan, “Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women Crisis: Technological 
Dimensions” (2016) 28:2 Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 321. 
23 David A Harris, “The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why “Driving While Black” Matters” (1999) 
84:2 Minnesota Law Review 265. 
24 Ontario Human Rights Commission, OHRC Response to the Race Data and Traffic Stops in Ottawa 
Report, (Ontario: OHRC, 18 November 2016), online: OHRC <www.ohrc.on.ca/en/ohrc-response-race-
data-and-traffic-stops-ottawa-report>; Lorne Foster, Les Jacobs & Bobby Siu, “Race Data and Traffic 
Stops in Ottawa, 2013-2015: A Report on Ottawa and the Police Districts” (Ottawa Police Services Board 
and Ottawa Police Service, October 2016) at 3 online: Ottawa Police 
<https://www.ottawapolice.ca/en/about-us/resources/.TSRDCP_York_Research_Report.pdf>.  
25 Kimberly D Bailey, “Watching Me: The War on Crime, Privacy, and the State” (2014) 47:5 UC Davis 
Law Review 1539 at 1542. 
 extreme privacy violations, which in turn pose a barrier to self-sufficiency and democratic 
participation”.26 
Privacy violations can increase marginalization by signaling that the victims lack social 
standing or somehow deserve the intrusion.27 The widespread practice of “carding”, for example, 
signals to others that those stopped by police might be dangerous, thus potentially altering 
attitudes and behavior toward them. Increased surveillance – and the lack of privacy that it entails 
– increases the risk that some wrongdoing will be identified. Paul Henman and Greg Marston, for 
example, discuss the “risk logic” of compliance activities in the Australian social security 
system.28 That system uses statistical profiling to identify clients who share characteristics with 
those who have in the past “been incorrectly paid” (read: committed welfare fraud). Even though 
individuals identified as having these characteristics may never themselves have “been 
incorrectly paid,”  they are subjected, by virtue of their statistical resemblance to the group who 
have, to increased surveillance – which, by its very nature, increases the likelihood that “incorrect 
payments” will be identified. The system is a self-reinforcing feedback loop that creates an 
underclass within the larger (and vulnerable) group of those receiving social benefits from the 
state. Jessica Roberts explicitly ties a lack of privacy to discrimination, noting that “[u]nlawful 
discrimination … frequently requires discriminators to have knowledge about protected status”.29 
Roberts’ analysis suggests that privacy may be important to prevent discrimination.30 While we 
do not believe that privacy protections could or should supplant equality-based anti-
discrimination measures and education, in a context in which identifiability as a member of 
particular marginalized communities is the basis for discrimination, it seems logical to suggest 
                                                        
26 Michele Estrin Gilman, “The Class Differential in Privacy Law” (2012) 77:4 Brooklyn Law Review 
1389 at 1395. 
27 See Craig Konnoth, “An Expressive Theory of Privacy Intrusions” (2017) 102:4 Iowa Law Review 1533 
for a discussion of this point. See also Julilly Kohler-Hausmann, “‘The Crime of Survival’: Fraud 
Prosecutions, Community Surveillance and the Original ‘Welfare Queen’” (2007) 41:2 Journal of Social 
History 329.   
28 Henman & Marston, supra note 17 at 200. 
29 Jessica L Roberts, “Protecting Privacy to Prevent Discrimination” (2015) 56:6 William and Mary Law 
Review 2097 at 2097.  
30 Ibid at 2101. 
 that privacy intrusions have the potential to foster discriminatory practices and thus privacy 
protection could help to reduce discrimination.  
 
B. Connecting the Privacy/Vulnerability Cycle to Court Records 
Calo identifies the relationship between privacy and vulnerability as a “circle” or “cycle”: “the 
more vulnerable a person is, the less privacy they tend to enjoy; meanwhile, a lack of privacy 
opens the door to greater vulnerability and exploitation”.31 In the remainder of this paper, we 
explore one version of this “vicious cycle”, examining the links between privacy, vulnerability, 
and the open (and increasingly online) publication of court records.  
We have argued elsewhere that although public access to court records is consistent with 
the open court principle, which supports transparency of court proceedings, public access to 
unredacted court records, particularly if placed online, presents significant and unwarranted 
privacy risks to those involved in court processes.32 These files often contain information that is 
deeply personal and potentially very sensitive, including identifying information, financial 
information, details about relationships, and details about health status.33 The release of this 
information exposes litigants, witnesses and others identified in the court processes to a variety of 
risks, including identity theft and extortion.34 Those identified in the records can suffer dignity 
harms when highly personal information such as the details of a marital breakdown become 
publicly available.35 When the information in the records includes details about protected status, 
there is also the risk of discrimination.36  
                                                        
31 Calo, supra note 1 at 591. 
32 Bailey & Burkell, supra note 2.  
33 Peter A Winn, “Online Court Records: Balancing Judicial Accountability and Privacy in an Age of 
Electronic Information” (2004) 79:1 Washington Law Review 307; Sujoy Chatterjee, “Balancing Privacy 
and the Open Court Principle in Family Law: Does De-Identifying Case Law Protect Anonymity?” (2014) 
23:1 Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies 9; Bailey & Burkell, ibid at 148. 
34 Bailey & Burkell, ibid at 175. 
35 Chatterjee, supra note 33 at 97. 
36 Roberts, supra note 29 at 2101. 
 Members of marginalized communities stand to suffer the most significant privacy harms 
from open court records that include names along with a vast array of other identifying, and often 
highly personal, information. In the following section, we identify three bases for this argument: 
first, members of marginalized communities are over-represented in many kinds of court 
proceedings; second, in order to contest (and potentially redress) the impact of marginalization, 
members of these communities are forced to engage with the justice system; third, the potentially 
stigmatizing information that is revealed about these individuals in court records leaves them 
vulnerable to increased discrimination and other harms.  
 
 (1) Vulnerable Populations Over-Represented in Court Proceedings 
Members of equality-seeking groups bear a larger privacy burden related to open court records to 
the extent that they are over-represented among those identified in those court records. Few 
statistics exist to document the demographic characteristics of individuals involved in the court 
system as defendants or parties, and even less evidence exists with respect to witnesses and others 
(e.g. children in family court cases) who are discussed in court proceedings. Nonetheless, analysis 
of involvement with the criminal justice system and examination of factors related to child 
protection issues and the incidence of justiciable problems strongly suggests that members of 
equality-seeking groups are likely to be over-represented in court records. 
Involvement with the criminal justice system is correlated with a range of overlapping 
marginalizing conditions. There is widespread recognition of the negative correlation between 
socioeconomic status and involvement with the criminal justice system: those lower on the 
socioeconomic scale are over-represented in the system.37 The limited body of research on the 
relationship between homelessness and the criminal justice system suggests that homeless 
individuals, including street-involved youth, are at an increased risk of involvement with the 
                                                        
37 Ruth R Kipping et al, “Multiple Risk Behaviour in Adolescence and Socio-Economic Status: Findings 
from a UK Birth Cohort” (2015) 25:1 European Journal of Public Health 44. 
 criminal justice system.38 A 2002 report on homeless individuals in Calgary, for example, 
indicated that over three-quarters had at some point in their lives been incarcerated,39 and 
homelessness and incarceration have a reciprocal relationship: homelessness increases the risk of 
incarceration, which is in turn associated with higher rates of homelessness.40 Among women 
who have been incarcerated, poverty is strongly associated with recidivism, and thus involvement 
anew in criminal justice proceedings.41  
In the United States, race is strongly associated with arrest history, particularly for males, 
with black males having a much higher probability of arrest record than any other group.42 
Canadian data show a similar picture, indicating that black inmates are over-represented in the 
incarcerated population.43 In Canada, a similar situation exists with respect to the Indigenous 
population. Indigenous people make up 4.3% of the general population, but 24.6% of the inmate 
population.44 Indigenous women are even more over-represented, comprising 35% of federal 
prison inmates, and are Canada’s fastest growing prison population.45 Gender non-conforming 
                                                        
38 Sylvia Novac et al, “Justice and Injustice: Homelessness, Crime, Victimization, and the Criminal Justice 
System” (2006) Centre for Urban and Community Studies, online: University of Toronto 
<www.urbancentre.utoronto.ca/pdfs/researchprojects/Novacet-al-207-JusticeHomeless2006.pdf>; 
Employment and Social Development Canada, “Mental Health Courts: Processes, Outcomes and Impact on 
Homelessness” by Sue-Ann MacDonald et al, (Montreal: Université de Montreal, May 2014), online: 
Canadian Observatory on Homelessness <www.homelesshub.ca/sites/default/files/ 
HKDFinalReport_2014.pdf >. 
39 Helen Gardiner & Kathleen Cairns, “2002 Calgary Homelessness Study”, Calgary Homeless Foundation 
(October 2002) at 46, online: CHF <http://homelesshub.ca/sites/default/files/Calgary%20 
Homelessness%20Study%202002.pdf>. 
40 “Criminal Justice, Homelessness & Health”, National Healthcare for the Homeless Council (2011) 
online: NHCHC <www.nhchc.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/CriminalJustice2011_final.pdf>. 
41 Kristy Holtfreter, Michael D Reisig & Merry Morash, “Poverty, State Capital, and Recidivism Among 
Women Offenders” (2004) 3:2 Criminology & Public Policy 185. 
42 Robert Brame et al, “Demographic Patterns of Cumulative Arrest Prevalence by Ages 18 and 23” (2014) 
60:3 Crime & Delinquency 471. 
43 As of 2015, the “federal incarceration rate for Blacks [was] three times their representation in Canadian 
society”. See Canada, Office of the Correctional Investigator, Annual Report of the Office of the 
Correctional Investigator 2014-2015, by Howard Sapers (Ottawa: OCI, 26 June, 2015), online: OCI 
<www.oci-bec.gc.ca/cnt/rpt/annrpt/annrpt20142015-eng.aspx>. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid.   
 youth, and particularly youth identifying as transgender, are more likely to be involved with the 
youth criminal justice system.46 
 
In a 2012 report, the Mental Health Commission of Canada47 noted the over-representation in the 
criminal justice system of those living with mental health issues; this issue may be particularly 
acute among youth.48 This over-representation, also observed in the United States, has been 
attributed in large part to deinstitutionalization.49 Although there is growing recognition that 
mental illness is unfairly criminalized in Canada,50 programs designed to divert those with mental 
illness before they are charged (police-based diversion programs) are of limited effectiveness 
given the lack of treatment options for those living with mental illness.51 Persons with intellectual 
disabilities are also over-represented in the criminal justice system,52 in part as a result of their 
lack of understanding of court processes and their rights within those processes.53 Within the 
criminal justice system, defendants with mental health issues can in some circumstances be 
diverted to special mental health courts,54 “designed to deal with accused persons who are 
                                                        
46 Angela Irvine, “We’ve Had Three of Them: Addressing the Invisibility of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and 
Gender Nonconforming Youths in the Juvenile Justice System” (2010) 19:3 Columbia Journal of Gender 
and Law 675; Jerome Hunt & Aisha C Moodie-Mills, “The Unfair Criminalization of Gay and Transgender 
Youth: An Overview of the Experiences of LGBT Youth in the Juvenile Justice System”, Center for 
American Progress (29 June 2012), online: Center for American Progress  
<https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/lgbt/reports/2012/06/29/11730/the-unfair-criminalization-of-
gay-and-transgender-youth/>. 
47 Mental Health Commission of Canada, Changing Directions, Changing Lives: The Mental Health 
Strategy for Canada (Calgary: MHCC, 2012), online: MHCC 
<strategy.mentalhealthcommission.ca/pdf/strategy-images-en.pdf>. 
48 Michele Peterson-Badali et al, “Mental Health in the Context of Canada’s Youth Justice System” (2015) 
19:1 Canadian Criminal Law Review 5. 
49 Gary Chaimowitz, “The Criminalization of People with Mental Illness” (2012) 57:2 Canadian Journal of  
Psychiatry 1. 
50 Ibid at 5. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Jessica Jones, “Persons with Intellectual Disabilities in the Criminal Justice System” (2007) 51:6 
International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology 723. 
53 Susan C Hayes, “Prevalence of Intellectual Disability in Local Courts” (1997) 22:2 Journal of Intellectual 
& Developmental Disability 71. See also Voula Marions et al, “Persons with Intellectual Disabilities and 
the Criminal Justice System: A View from Criminal Justice Professionals in Ontario” (2017) 64:1 Criminal 
Law Quarterly 83. 
54 Steven K Erickson, Amy Campbell & Steven J Lamberti, “Variations in Mental Health Courts: 
Challenges, Opportunities, and a Call for Action” (2006) 42:4 Community Mental Health Journal 335. 
 experiencing mental health difficulties with understanding and sensitivity”.55 Defendants must 
meet strict criteria before diversion to these special courts: primary among these is the condition 
that the individual must be diagnosed with a mental disorder.56 The mere fact of diversion to these 
courts, therefore, reveals meaningful and likely stigmatizing information about the individual 
whose case is diverted. Despite this, mental health court records57 and the results of appeals from 
those courts are not routinely anonymized across Canada.58  
Over-representation of marginalized populations is not limited to the criminal justice 
system. In Canada59 and elsewhere,60 Indigenous children, and thus their parents, are at increased 
risk for involvement in the child welfare system. Similarly, parents with intellectual disabilities 
constitute a higher proportion of child protection cases than would be expected given the 
prevalence of intellectual disabilities in the general population.61 One study of the BC child 
protection system documented a litany of intersecting challenges facing those (mostly women) 
involved in that system, including domestic violence, mental health issues, poverty, and addiction 
issues; that study also noted the over-representation of Indigenous mothers in the child protection 
cases they reviewed.62 Although child welfare system proceedings are protected from public 
access, in many of these cases there are concurrent criminal and/or family proceedings that do not 
                                                        
55 “Mental Health Court”, Legal Aid Ontario, online: Legal Aid Ontario <lawfacts.ca/mental-health/court>.  
56 See for example the eligibility for Mental Health Court in Nova Scotia: See, “Nova Scotia Mental Health 
Court Program”, Courts of Nova Scotia, online: Courts of Nova Scotia 
<www.courts.ns.ca/Provincial_Court/NSPC_mental_health_program.htm>. 
57 For example, hearings in and records relating to Vancouver’s Downtown Community Court are public. 
58 See, for example: R v E, 2012 NLCA 26.  We have chosen to anonymize citations that raise the very 
privacy and equality concerns discussed in this article. 
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 automatically receive such protection;63 thus, the greater involvement of individuals from 
equality-seeking groups in these matters is likely to be associated with involvement in other 
justice system proceedings that do present privacy risks. 
Members of vulnerable groups including Indigenous peoples, immigrants, those receiving 
social assistance, members of ethnic minorities, and those living with disabilities are more likely 
to experience justiciable problems such as personal injury, family breakdown, or issues with 
assistance programs.64 These problems, moreover, tend to occur in clusters: for example, legal 
problems related to separation are often accompanied by problems with domestic violence, and 
other issues related to family breakdown such as custody and access.65 Similarly, individuals 
living with disabilities are not only more likely to experience these types of problems; they also 
experience more such problems.66 To the extent that members of marginalized groups recognize 
their problems as legal problems or are involved with others who do, they may be more likely to 
be involved, and involved more intensely, with the civil justice system. 
Many of these risk factors intersect in the lives of affected individuals, with a 
compounding impact on the likelihood that the individual will be involved with the court system. 
Mental health issues and drug use are elevated among the homeless population.67 People with 
mental health challenges often live in poverty, while mentally ill and homeless adults are more 
likely to be involved in the criminal justice system if they also experience substance misuse and 
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 previous victimization.68 Indigenous peoples are more likely than the general population to live in 
conditions of homelessness.69   
An exhaustive review of the relationship between vulnerability and justice system 
involvement is beyond the scope of this paper, but the pattern is clear: people who are socially 
marginalized are more likely to be involved with the justice system (or at least with certain 
aspects of it). Those individuals involved in the system are also vulnerable to the privacy harms 
that result from being identified in court records. Those harms, therefore, are differentially 
affecting specific groups – the socially marginalized who are, by virtue of a wide range of factors, 
more likely to be in the courts.  
 
 (2) Addressing Marginalization in the Courts 
Marginalized individuals suffer harms related to their marginalized status – and one way to 
address these harms is to seek relief in the courts or through administrative tribunals. These 
situations constitute a kind of double jeopardy or recursive effect: vulnerability leads to 
involvement with the justice system, which leads to loss of privacy, including privacy with 
respect to vulnerable status, which in turn can lead to increased discrimination.  
Homeless individuals, for example, have been involved in court proceedings that test 
their right to erect shelters in public parks70 or on city property,71 with the result that their names 
are made public along with details of their homeless status. ‘Safe Streets’ legislation, passed in 
Ontario72 and in British Columbia,73 prohibits “aggressive solicitation of persons in public 
places”, allowing police to issue tickets for panhandling. Given that the individuals so charged are 
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 typically living in conditions of poverty, it is not surprising that the tickets often go unpaid. At 
least one individual has been taken to court over unpaid fines.74 This individual opted to 
participate in press interviews about the case, and thus forewent his privacy with respect to the 
court proceeding and personal information about himself and his situation.75 Nonetheless, his 
option to maintain privacy with respect to private matters including his homeless status would 
have been wiped out by the public nature of the court proceeding. In other cases, individuals have 
been charged under Ontario’s Safe Streets Act for soliciting an individual waiting at a bus stop76 
or offering to clean car windows for passing motorists.77 Although the disclosures in most of 
these records are limited to the names of the individuals involved and the activities they are 
charged with undertaking (which by extension label the individuals as street-involved), one of the 
records goes into much greater detail, revealing highly personal information about the social 
history and mental health of the individual charged with the offence.  In these cases, there is a 
direct link between marginalized status (homelessness, for example) and the appearance before 
the courts. 
 The relationship between vulnerability and involvement is even more direct in the case of 
human rights tribunals, where it is precisely an experience of alleged discrimination on the basis 
of protected grounds that brings the individual to the tribunal. Some other tribunals and boards, 
including the Veterans Appeal Review Board, routinely remove identifying information on the 
grounds that it is “personal information not relevant to the decision”.78 Likewise, the Social 
Benefits Tribunal of Ontario holds hearings in private because of the sensitive personal 
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 information involved in the cases.79 Many individuals involved in immigration and refugee 
proceedings are there precisely because they are members of equality-seeking groups. The status 
of sensitive information revealed in these hearings is complex: proceedings before the Refugee 
Protection Division and the Refugee Appeal Division are private unless decisions are before the 
Federal Court for judicial review, and proceedings before the Immigration Appeal Division and 
the Immigration Division are public. Human rights tribunals in Canada, however, default to the 
identification of parties involved in human rights cases. The Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario 
(“HRTO”), for example, tells potential applicants that “the hearings and decisions of the HRTO 
are public except in very special circumstances … and the tribunal’s decisions, which include the 
applicants’ names and relevant evidence, are made publicly available through legal reporting 
services”.80 We will return to the HRTO’s practices with respect to anonymization in Part III 
below. 
 
 (3) Records Reveal Stigmatizing Information 
Open records of human rights tribunal proceedings reveal not only the name of the applicant, but 
also details of the alleged discrimination including the basis for that alleged discrimination 
(unless the applicant is successful in taking the often-costly step of seeking a publication ban or 
some other form of confidentiality order).  Thus, for example, in the records of these cases we can 
come to learn that an applicant suffers from depression, is pregnant, lives with a learning 
disability, identifies as transgender, or is homeless. These details are not incidentally revealed as 
part of the tribunal proceeding – they are necessarily revealed since they often constitute the basis 
of the claim that is substance of the proceeding. Moreover, the personal information that is 
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 exposed in these records leaves the individual vulnerable to further discrimination. Thus, public 
access to these records can contribute to a “vicious cycle” of vulnerability. 
The concern is not unfounded. One complainant who was found by the BC Human 
Rights Tribunal (BCHRT) to have experienced discrimination based on a mental health issue81 
was in front of that same tribunal seven years later, again alleging discrimination based on mental 
illness.82 In that second complaint, which the Tribunal determined was justified, it was alleged 
that the respondents enacted their discrimination on the basis of information gleaned from the 
earlier human rights case – in other words, their knowledge of the mental illness could at least in 
part be attributed to an earlier, and public, human rights complaint.83    
Presumptive openness of court and tribunal records constitutes, for litigants, witnesses, 
and others named in the court process, forced disclosure of personal information. Given the 
option, people make careful and thoughtful decisions about to whom, when, and where to 
disclose personal information.84 This may be particularly true for stigmatizing conditions, where 
the potential consequences of disclosure include discrimination, social isolation, and even 
physical danger. Many individuals living with a disability, for example, choose not to disclose, in 
large part for fear of discrimination, especially with respect to employment.85 Individuals in the 
work force dealing with mental health issues who choose not to disclose cite fear of 
discrimination as the primary reason.86 Many living with positive HIV status carefully balance the 
psychological advantages of disclosure against the costs in terms of stigma and social inclusion.87 
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 While disclosure of transgender identity can have positive impacts on psychological well-being 
and personal relationships, it also raises the risk of loss of relationships and even physical 
violence.88  Notwithstanding the potential destigmatizing effects,89 disclosure of a marginalized 
status can harm the individual involved.90 It has been compellingly argued that we should not 
force such disclosures,91 since the practice could contravene constitutional protections,92 and 
might even be considered immoral.93  
Over-representation of marginalized communities in court and tribunal proceedings, often 
because of the impact of marginalization, combined with the potentially stigmatizing information 
that is revealed about individuals in court records leaves members of these communities 
disproportionately vulnerable to further discrimination and other harms. The potential for these 
harms stand to be exacerbated by widespread publicly-accessible online access to court records. 
We turn now to examine some of the limited instances in which Canadian law has recognized and 
responded to this “vicious cycle”. 
 
III.  Recognition of the Privacy/Vulnerability Cycle in Canadian Law 
Notwithstanding that in most cases the privacy of those involved with court proceedings is not 
protected, our purpose in this section is to identify situations where Canadian law has explicitly or 
implicitly recognized the privacy/vulnerability cycle as a justification for limiting publication 
related to, or disclosure within court proceedings involving members of marginalized 
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 communities. In tandem with situations in which Canadian courts and legislatures have 
recognized the privacy/vulnerability cycle in the context of disclosure of information to the public 
about court proceedings, are privacy-justified rules that limit both what must be produced in 
litigation and what can be done with it afterward. We begin by briefly discussing publication 
bans, which limit public access to information about court proceedings, and then turn to case-by-
case privilege and deemed/implied undertakings, which impose terms relating to disclosure within 
litigation. In both cases, the law recognizes the privacy/vulnerability cycle and expresses concern 
about the impact of process-imposed vulnerability on the administration of justice. We note the 
transition in this law from recognition of a general privacy/vulnerability cycle to limited 
recognition of special risks to specific equality-seeking communities: children and sexual assault 
survivors in particular. After discussing publication bans, case-by-case privilege and deemed 
undertakings, we explore other legal manifestations of concern for children and sexual assault 
survivors before turning to consider more sporadic legal acknowledgments of the 
privacy/vulnerability cycle relating to other equality-seeking groups. Finally, we consider policy 
development and commentary focused on the privacy/vulnerability cycle in the context of online 
court records, which supports our concern about the potential for online records to exacerbate the 
cycle for equality-seeking communities.    
 
A. Publication Bans and the Privacy/Vulnerability Cycle 
The open court principle is highly venerated in Canadian law. It provides that, as a general rule, 
court processes and court records should be publicly accessible. Openness is said to build “public 
confidence in the integrity of the judicial system by allowing members of the public to hold 
judges to account”.94 The common law principle in favour of openness is also mirrored in 
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 provincial, federal and territorial statutes and policies governing court proceedings.95 
Nevertheless, Canadian courts and legislators have recognized that, in certain circumstances, 
open access can undermine justice or come at too great a cost to other democratic values in a 
variety of ways. As a result, certain statutes and common law principles provide for courts and 
certain other decision-making bodies to determine on a case-by-case basis whether there should 
be an exception to that rule. These case-by-case decisions are to be made with reference to the 
Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions in two seminal cases relating to publication bans, R v 
Mentuck96 and Dagenais v Canadian Broadcasting Corp.97   
 In Mentuck, the Supreme Court of Canada held that a publication ban should only be 
issued where: 
(a) such an order is necessary in order to prevent a serious risk to the proper 
administration of justice because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent the 
risk; and 
(b) the salutary effects of the publication ban outweigh the deleterious effects on the 
rights and interests of the parties and the public, including the effects on the right to free 
expression, the right of the accused to a fair and public trial, and the efficacy of the 
administration of justice.98 
In Dagenais, the Supreme Court of Canada pointed to a long list of competing considerations of 
sufficient weight to warrant a publication ban. At least three of these implicitly recognize the way 
in which a lack of privacy can exacerbate inequality and vulnerability, namely: protecting 
vulnerable witnesses (e.g. children, sexual assault complainants); reducing the stigma of 
conviction for young offenders, thereby increasing the possibility of rehabilitation; and 
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 encouraging reporting of sexual offences by reducing the fear of notoriety of becoming a 
complainant.99 
The issues of protecting children and targets of sexual violence came together in AB v 
Bragg.100  The Supreme Court of Canada held that a teen girl who sought a publication ban on the 
content of a Facebook page in which she was subjected to “sexualized cyberbullying”, should be 
allowed to proceed using a pseudonym on a preliminary application for disclosure.101 Relying on 
the decisions in Dagenais and Mentuck, and noting research showing that “allowing the names of 
child victims and other identifying information to appear in the media can exacerbate trauma, 
complicate recovery, discourage future disclosures, and inhibit cooperation with authorities”,102 
as well as the lasting harms of the publicity of sexualized online attacks, Abella J, writing for the 
Court, concluded: 
 
If we value the right of children to protect themselves from bullying, cyber or otherwise, 
if common sense and the evidence persuade us that young victims of sexualized bullying 
are particularly vulnerable to the harms of revictimization upon publication, and if we 
accept that the right to protection will disappear for most children without the further 
protection of anonymity, we are compellingly drawn in this case to allowing A.B.’s 
anonymous legal pursuit of the identity of her cyberbully.103  
 
Here the Court explicitly recognized the “vicious cycle” of a lack of privacy and the “inherent 
vulnerability of children”.104 In addition, Abella J noted that “[i]n the context of sexual assault, 
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 this Court has already recognized that protecting a victim’s privacy encourages reporting”.105 In 
this way, the cycle of gender inequality and lack of privacy in court proceedings is evident, 
although the Court did not explicitly discuss the plaintiff’s situation in these terms. The plaintiff 
had already suffered a sexualized online attack (which included someone impersonating her and 
posting a photo of her), a kind of attack disproportionately suffered by women and girls, who are 
also more likely to be shamed in relation to exhibitions of their sexuality.106 A refusal to grant AB 
a degree of privacy in relation to her legal proceeding would have re-subjected her to further 
gendered scrutiny and attack – a classic illustration of the “vicious cycle” between the 
vulnerability of marginalized populations and a lack of privacy in court proceedings. Although 
AB was ultimately able to proceed under a pseudonym, her right to do so came at the cost of 
appeals all the way to the Supreme Court of Canada – a price most people, particularly those from 
many marginalized communities, are unlikely to be able to pay.   
 
B. Case-by-case Privilege and Deemed/Implied Undertakings 
In contrast with publication bans, which focus solely on public access to information about court 
proceedings, case-by-case privilege and deemed/implied undertakings impose limits relating to 
procedures internal to litigation. In both cases the focus is on balancing privacy with other kinds 
of public interests. In some cases, Canadian courts explicitly or implicitly connect privacy with 
vulnerability, and the risk that exposing litigants to too much vulnerability will jeopardize their 
right and ability to seek legal remedies. Thus, despite the truth-finding goal of litigation and the 
idea that disclosure of all relevant information best serves that goal, parties need not produce all 
relevant documents within litigation. As the British Columbia Court of Appeal, per Southin JA, 
noted in Interclaim Holdings Limited v Down: 
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 Suffice it to say that, in my opinion, … the notion that everybody is entitled to have 
access to everything filed in civil proceedings … in contradistinction to having the right 
to be present at every proceeding in which a final judgment is sought should be 
canvassed again.  A legal system which has no decent respect for the privacy of litigants 
is as tyrannical as a legal system in which rights are determined behind closed doors.107 
 
Documents subject to privilege represent an important exception to the general disclosure rule.108 
While the traditional categories of privilege protect the solicitor-client relationship (solicitor-
client privilege) and the process of litigation (litigation privilege), in Slavutych v Baker et al, the 
Supreme Court of Canada confirmed that those categories are not closed109 and adopted a four-
part test for determining on a case-by-case basis whether materials claimed to be confidential 
should be exempt from disclosure. This privilege applies to communications that: (i) originate in 
confidence; (ii) where confidence is essential to the relationship in which the communication 
arose; (iii) that relationship is one that should be “sedulously fostered; and (iv) the interests 
served by protecting against disclosure outweigh the interest in getting at the truth to correctly 
resolve the litigation.110   
In applying this four-part test in the context of a civil sexual assault case in M(A) v Ryan, 
where the defendant sought production of records from the plaintiff’s psychiatrist, the Supreme 
Court of Canada found that if psychiatrist-patient confidence was broken, it could jeopardize a 
patient’s willingness to seek treatment.111 Justice McLachlin (as she was then) writing for the 
majority, noted that such an outcome was to be avoided, especially in the context of survivors of 
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 “sexual abuse [who] often suffer trauma, which, left untreated, may mar their entire lives”.112 In 
reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on constitutional protections for privacy and equality, 
noting: 
 
A rule of privilege which fails to protect confidential doctor/patient communications in 
the context of an action arising out of sexual assault perpetuates the disadvantage felt by 
victims of sexual assault, often women. The intimate nature of sexual assault heightens 
the privacy concerns of the victim and may increase, if automatic disclosure is the rule, 
the difficulty of obtaining redress for the wrong. The victim of a sexual assault is thus 
placed in a disadvantaged position as compared with the victim of a different wrong. The 
result may be that the victim of sexual assault does not obtain the equal benefit of the law 
to which s. 15 of the Charter entitles her. She is doubly victimized, initially by the sexual 
assault and later by the price she must pay to claim redress.113 
 
McLachlin J  also rejected the argument that a plaintiff forfeits the right to privacy by 
commencing litigation, finding: 
 
I accept that a litigant must accept such intrusions upon her privacy as are necessary to 
enable the judge or jury to get to the truth and render a just verdict. But I do not accept 
that by claiming such damages as the law allows, a litigant grants her opponent a licence 
to delve into private aspects of her life which need not be probed for the proper 
disposition of the litigation.114 
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 This reasoning subsequently carried over into analysis of the privacy rights of sexual assault 
complainants in the context of the deemed undertaking.  
 
The deemed and implied undertaking rules115 generally prohibit disclosure of “pre-trial 
documentary and oral discovery for purposes other than the litigation in which it was 
obtained”.116 Although these rules do not place similar restrictions on documentary and oral 
discovery that make their way into the public record during trials or motions, they nevertheless 
reflect recognition of the privacy/vulnerability cycle and its potential impact on the administration 
of justice. In Juman v Doucette, the Supreme Court of Canada, per Binnie J, pointed to privacy 
protection as one of two related rationales for these undertakings: 
 
The public interest in getting at the truth in a civil action outweighs the examinee’s 
privacy interest, but the latter is nevertheless entitled to a measure of protection. The 
answers and documents are compelled by statute solely for the purpose of the civil action 
and the law thus requires that the invasion of privacy should generally be limited to the 
level of disclosure necessary to satisfy that purpose and that purpose alone. ... 
 
There is a second rationale supporting the existence of an implied undertaking. A litigant 
who has some assurance that the documents and answers will not be used for a purpose 
collateral or ulterior to the proceedings in which they are demanded will be encouraged to 
provide a more complete and candid discovery.117   
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 That the imposition of such limits can be of particular importance in the context of civil and 
criminal proceedings relating to sexual assault was recognized at first instance in SC v NS where 
the defendant in a criminal sexual assault trial used documents produced by the complainant in a 
civil sexual assault proceeding in order to impeach her during her testimony at the criminal 
trial.118 The Court’s finding that the deemed undertaking prevented the defendant from using the 
documents in another proceeding without first seeking leave of the court was overturned on 
appeal.  However, the observations of Matheson J with respect to privacy remain apt.  Justice 
Matheson rejected the defendant’s argument that the plaintiff had given up her right to privacy by 
initiating the civil action, reasoning: 
 
If that choice defeated all privacy interests, the deemed undertaking would not exist.  
Instead, the court and the Rules of Civil Procedure have acknowledged that plaintiffs 
remain entitled to some measure of protection of their privacy and are entitled to 
limitations on the use of their discovery evidence outside the proceedings for which the 
discovery was compelled.119 
 
Finding that “[t]he primary concern underlying the undertaking is the protection of privacy – 
discovery is an invasion of the right of an individual to keep one’s evidence and documents to 
oneself”,120 Matheson J went on to note the privacy/vulnerability cycle recognized in Criminal 
Code121 restrictions on use of complainant’s medical or counselling records in a sexual assault 
trial. In particular, she noted that parliamentary adoption of those restrictions and a detailed 
process for determining whether such records could be used: 
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 Parliament has recognized that the compelled production of personal information may 
deter complainants of sexual offences from reporting the events to police and from 
seeking the necessary treatment, counselling or advice; that production may breach a 
person’s right to privacy and equality; and that the production to the accused of such 
information may be necessary in order for an accused to make full answer and defence.122 
 
We turn now to discuss specific exceptions to openness in relation to children and sexual assault 
complainants found elsewhere in Canadian law in order to highlight the role that recognition of 
the privacy/vulnerability cycle plays in relation to each, paying particular attention to 
explanations for exceptions that connect privacy, vulnerability and membership in equality-
seeking communities. 
 
C. Children and the Privacy/Vulnerability Cycle 
The connection between the privacy/vulnerability cycle and marginalization is most consistently 
demonstrated in Canadian law with respect to the protection of children in court proceedings. 
Here we provide examples from two areas: child welfare and family law proceedings, and the 
Youth Criminal Justice Act (“YCJA”).123 
 
(1) Child Welfare and Family Law Proceedings 
In addition to the examples discussed in part A above, Canadian courts also connect privacy with 
the vulnerability of children in the context of provincial child welfare legislation124 and in family 
law proceedings.125 Although child welfare legislation can incorporate both provisions that 
initially presume in favour of openness and those that initially presume against openness, here we 
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 focus on the former. In Chatham-Kent Children’s Services v AH, the Ontario Superior Court of 
Justice allowed a media request to vary an order excluding the public from a hearing by allowing 
access to a redacted copy of the transcript of an in camera hearing in a child protection 
proceeding involving the disappearance of several children who had been apprehended from the 
jurisdiction.126 Although citing Bragg, and other criminal and family law cases, Templeton J 
noted that the case before him was not a criminal, civil matter or family law matter, but a child 
protection proceeding. He concluded that restrictions on public access to the transcript were 
necessary because:  
in certain circumstances, the protection of a vulnerable child and that child’s privacy may 
well go beyond merely the name of the child in protection proceedings. Children who are 
the subject of an application by the state for intervention are also allegedly vulnerable in 
their environment at home, at school and/or in their neighbourhood. They are subject to 
the conduct and attitudes of the adults who interact with them. Disclosure to others of the 
intimacy of their lives is beyond their control. Without the ability or opportunity for 
critical thought, they are swept into a process of the balancing of rights of others and in 
that process, it can be difficult to hear their voice.  
 
... In other words, the child’s world and privacy are inextricably linked to an investigation 
of the parent’s.127 
 
As a result, Templeton J concluded that in child protection matters, “the need to shield a 
vulnerable child rests not only on the child’s chronological age but also and perhaps more 
significantly, the factual circumstances in which the child lives or has been placed”.128 
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 In contrast, while citing similar authorities to those relied upon in AH, the Saskatchewan 
Court of Queen’s Bench, per Rothery J, concluded in the context of child protection proceedings 
in R(MN) v Saskatchewan (Minister of Social Services) that the CBC could publish the name of a 
parent accused of harming her children, provided that they gave advanced notice of the broadcast 
to the Department of Social Services in the area where her children resided.129  Rothery J found 
that although section 26(2) of the Child and Family Services Act130 permitted publication bans 
where publication would not be in the best interests of a child involved in the hearing or would 
likely identify a child, “[t]he court is not permitted to weigh the effect of the publication on the 
parents of the child. Thus, unless the publication of the parent’s name affects the child, there is no 
justification for the limitation of the freedom of expression”.131   
Meanwhile, in British Columbia, rules of court impose stringent restrictions on public 
access to court records relating to child welfare proceedings, family law cases and separation 
agreements,132 and various statutes restrict publication of information in family and children’s 
matters that would likely disclose the identity of a child or party.133 As a result, although BC 
offers the most extensive online access to court records in Canada through Court Services Online 
(“CSO”),134 public access is available only in relation to civil and criminal cases (with certain 
exceptions discussed further below), and not in relation to family law cases.  
 
(2) Youth Criminal Justice Act 
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 The YCJA came into effect in 2003, replacing the Young Offenders Act, which had been in place 
since 1984.135 The YCJA creates a specialized framework for dealing with children under the age 
of 12 and young people between the ages of 12 and 18 who are involved in criminal offences.136 
It recognizes society’s responsibility to “address the developmental challenges and the needs of 
young persons and to guide them into adulthood”, as well as the “special guarantees” of 
children’s and young people’s rights and freedoms, and the goal of “effective rehabilitation and 
reintegration” of young people into society after involvement in criminal proceedings.137   
Restrictions relating to publication, records and information about young people are 
imposed in Part 6 of the YCJA as one means of addressing these objectives. For example, section 
110(1) prohibits (subject to specific exceptions) publication of the name of any young person 
dealt with under the YCJA, or any other information about them that would identify them, while 
later sections in Part 6 impose limitations on creation, access to, and destruction of records related 
to YCJA investigations and proceedings involving young people.138 Generally, breach of the 
publication ban is a criminal offence.139 According to the Department of Justice: 
 
The rationale for protecting the privacy of young persons through publication bans is in 
recognition of their immaturity and the need to protect them from the harmful effects of 
publication so that their chances of rehabilitation are maximized.140 
 
The cycle connecting privacy, vulnerability and youth is explored in some detail in a number of 
Canadian cases and has been reiterated frequently in parliamentary debate.141 
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 In FN (Re) the Supreme Court of Canada found that section 110(1) protected already 
vulnerable youth made more vulnerable by publication, while at the same time achieving broader 
societal goals.  Writing for the Court, Binnie J, noted: 
 
Stigmatization or premature “labeling” of a young offender still in his or her formative 
years is well understood as a problem in the juvenile justice system. A young person once 
stigmatized as a lawbreaker may, unless given help and redirection, render the stigma a 
self-fulfilling prophecy. In the long run, society is best protected by preventing 
recurrence. Lamer CJ, in Dagenais … pointed out in another context that non-publication 
is designed to “maximize the chances of rehabilitation for “young offenders””.142 
  
Abella J, writing for the majority in R v DB the Supreme Court of Canada, cited social science 
research and international instruments recognizing the negative impact of media on young people, 
in support of the conclusion that the YCJA restrictions on publication afforded necessary 
protection to youth because of the  “greater psychological and social stress” they would be 
vulnerable to upon publication.143 The majority cited expert testimony before the Standing 
Committee on Justice that indicated that “you’d be hard-pressed to find a single professional who 
has worked in this area who would be in favour of the publication of names”, and appellate 
authority from Quebec and Ontario emphasizing the “damage” that “stigmatizing and labelling” a 
young person could do to their self-image and self-worth.144 In light of this, the majority, per 
Abella J, found that lifting a ban on publication should be seen as an element of sentencing that 
                                                                                                                                                                     
141 See e.g. House of Commons Debates, 37th Parl, 1st Sess, Vol 137, No 067 (29 May 2001) at 4343 
(Odina Desrochers); House of Commons Debates, 37th Parl, 1st Sess, Vol 137, No 036 (26 March 2001) at 
2217 (Reg Alcock); House of Commons Debates, 37th Parl, 1st Sess, Vol 137, No 036 (26 March 2001) at 
2217 (Ken Epp).  
142 2000 SCC 35 at para 14. 
143 2008 SCC 25 at para 87 [DB]. 
144 Ibid at paras 84-85. 
 “renders the sentence more severe”.145 However, the majority also tied the right to privacy 
protection to a presumed “diminished moral culpability” of young persons, noting that children’s 
“lack of experience with the world warrants leniency and optimism for the future”, and 
concluding that “offenders who act out of immaturity, impulsiveness, or other 
ill-considered motivation are not to be dealt with as if they were proceeding with the same degree 
of insight into their wrongdoing as more mature, reflective, or considered individuals”.146 
Obviously, this particular aspect of the explanation of the privacy/vulnerability cycle cannot and 
should not be extended to adults from other equality-seeking groups.  
Relying in part on DB, the Ontario Court of Justice, per Cohen J, in Toronto Star 
Newspaper Ltd. v Ontario pointed to the YCJA restrictions on publication as one indication that 
the proper administration of justice requires consideration of young people’s privacy rights.147 
Cohen J denied a media request for access to victim impact statements and pre-sentence reports in 
three cases involving young offenders convicted of serious crimes. She found that the YCJA 
publication restrictions were connected to the presumed diminished moral culpability of young 
people, but were also rooted in protecting their “dignity, personal integrity and autonomy” as 
required by the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms.148 The reasoning in Toronto Star, which the Supreme Court of Canada cited with 
approval in Bragg,149 has also been relied upon by other Ontario courts as a touchstone for 
protecting young people when determining whether court-connected materials relating to them 
ought to be disclosed.150 
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 D. Sexual Assault Complainants and the Privacy/Vulnerability Cycle 
A number of Criminal Code provisions that connect the privacy/vulnerability cycle with 
inequality relate to sexual assault complainants. Here we focus on two such provisions: 
prohibition of the publication of identifying information about sexual assault complainants and 
restrictions on the use of complainants’ past sexual history at trial. 
 
(1) Prohibitions on Publication of Identifying Information  
The Criminal Code includes numerous provisions that initially presume in favour of openness, 
but grant judges discretion to impose restrictions relating to hearings and publication of 
identifying information. For example, under section 486.31 a judge may, on application by the 
prosecutor or a witness, order non-disclosure of a witness’ identity.151 Under section 486.4 a 
judge may order non-disclosure of information that could identify a witness or victim in the 
context of proceedings involving sexual offences.152 However, under section 486.4(2), a judge 
must order non-disclosure of identifying information relating to a witness under 18 or a victim in 
proceedings involving sexual offences if the witness, victim or prosecutor applies for such an 
order.153 In considering the constitutionality of this provision in Canadian Newspapers Co v 
Canada (Attorney General),154 the Supreme Court of Canada connected the cycle of privacy and 
vulnerability to the broader societal objective of encouraging reporting of widely under-reported 
sexual offences.  Lamer J (as he then was), writing for the Court, noted: 
 
In the present case, the impugned provision purports to foster complaints by victims of 
sexual assault by protecting them from the trauma of wide-spread publication resulting in 
embarrassment and humiliation.  Encouraging victims to come forward and complain 
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 facilitates the prosecution and conviction of those guilty of sexual offences.  Ultimately, 
the overall objective of the publication ban ... is to favour the suppression of crime and to 
improve the administration of justice.155 
 
In this way, the Court recognized the connection between privacy and vulnerability, finding that it 
weighed in favour of imposing limitations on publication. However, it tied the concern about 
protecting against vulnerability to goals relating to the administration of justice, rather than to 
protecting the privacy rights of an equality-seeking group per se. This, combined with the fact 
that the Criminal Code provision permits the decision about publication to be taken out of a 
sexually assaulted woman’s hands by allowing the prosecutor to make the application, raises 
questions about how effectively it addresses the privacy/vulnerability cycle for women, who are 
disproportionately likely to be victims of sexual violence.156   
 
(2) Restrictions on the Use of Complainants’ Past Sexual History 
The Criminal Code also addresses the privacy rights of sexual assault complainants by imposing 
limits on use of the complainant’s past sexual history. Section 276 of the Criminal Code, requires 
an accused who seeks to bring forward the past sexual history of a complainant in a sexual assault 
case to first bring a motion for leave to do so.157 In deciding whether to allow such evidence, the 
court must consider, among other things, “the need to remove from the fact-finding process any 
discriminatory belief or bias” and “the potential prejudice to the complainant’s personal dignity 
and right of privacy”.158 Publication, broadcast or transmission of information relating to the 
application is prohibited unless the evidence is determined admissible or the judge orders the 
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 determination and reasons to be published.159 While it is at best unclear whether this provision is 
actually applied in a way that positively affects equality,160 the reasoning underlying the provision 
does connect privacy, vulnerability and equality. 
 
In R v Mills161 the Court, referring to its reasons in M(A) (discussed above in Part III.B)., 
upheld the constitutionality of Criminal Code amendments that protected against what Justice 
L’Heureux-Dubé had previously referred to as “extensive and unwarranted inquiries into the past 
histories and private lives of complainants of sexual assault”, a practice she said “indulges the 
discriminatory suspicion that women and children’s reports of sexual victimization are uniquely 
likely to be fabricated”.162 Noting privacy’s “underlying values of dignity, integrity and 
autonomy”,163 McLachlin and Iacobucci JJ, writing for the majority in Mills, went on to connect 
the privacy/vulnerability cycle to equality in the context of compelled disclosure in court 
proceedings: 
 
When the boundary between privacy and full answer and defence is not properly 
delineated, the equality of individuals whose lives are heavily documented is also 
affected, as these individuals have more records that will be subject to wrongful scrutiny. 
Karen Busby cautions that the use of records to challenge credibility at large 
  
will subject those whose lives already have been subject to extensive 
documentation to extraordinarily invasive review. This would include women 
whose lives have been documented under conditions of multiple inequalities and 
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 institutionalization such as Aboriginal women, women with disabilities, or 
women who have been imprisoned or involved with child welfare agencies.164 
 
E. Other Equality-Seeking Groups and the Privacy/Vulnerability Cycle 
Although Canadian law involving young persons and sexual assault complainants more 
consistently (but certainly not always) acknowledges the privacy/vulnerability cycle and its 
connection to equality, there is at least a limited recognition of the cycle in relation to certain 
other equality-seeking groups. This pattern is repeated in the human rights tribunal cases to which 
we now turn. 
 As discussed in Part II.B.2. above, certain court and tribunal rules and procedures also 
recognize and attempt to mitigate the “vicious cycle” of privacy loss and vulnerability, although 
the rationale for defaulting in favour of access in some cases where clearly vulnerable community 
members are involved and not in others involving equally vulnerable participants remains 
unclear. Nonetheless, here we explore HRTO practices that suggest privacy/vulnerability 
rationales for limiting access to records and/or proceedings. 
As noted above, human rights proceedings, based as they are on claims related to social 
locations that render individuals and groups vulnerable to discrimination, would seem to provide 
classic examples of situations in which the privacy/vulnerability cycle is likely be at play. Many 
human rights tribunals in Canada are authorized to preclude public access to hearings and to limit 
access to their case files on a case-by-case basis.165 Hearings before the HRTO, for example, “are 
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 open to the public” unless the Tribunal orders otherwise,166 and all written decisions are publicly 
available.167 The HRTO may order protection of the “confidentiality of personal or sensitive 
information where it considers it appropriate to do so”, but unless otherwise ordered, in its 
decisions it must use initials to identify children under 18 and the representative of children under 
18 in the proceeding.168 HRTO’s practice direction states anonymization of decisions will only 
happen in two circumstances: to protect children’s identity or in “exceptional circumstances”.169 
As such, we again see a prioritization of children’s privacy. 
 MacDonnell’s analysis of HRTO decisions relating to requests for confidentiality suggest 
that success in such cases is more likely for minors, applicants claiming sexual harassment,170 and 
where a ban has issued in a related criminal case. Anonymization has also been ordered in a 
handful of cases where the sexual orientation or gender identity of the applicant was in issue.171 In 
contrast, confidentiality requests in cases involving claims related to race, ethnic origin, creed, 
place of origin or ethnic origin, or which raised the issue of reprisal were unsuccessful, while 
requests in cases involving disability produced mixed results.172 In a case decided after 
MacDonnell’s analysis, a request on the basis of being a recipient of social assistance was 
rejected.173  
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 The HRTO imposes a high standard for obtaining confidentiality with respect to 
disability, notwithstanding social science evidence documenting the continuing stigma attached to 
mental illness and the negative employment, insurance, parenting and other life repercussions that 
can result from disclosure of mental illness.174 For example, in K v Northern Initiative for Social 
Action, the HRTO concluded that “[a] general claim that there is still stigma associated with 
mental illness is insufficient” to justify anonymization.175 In light of this approach, it seems 
logical to suggest that those who prefer not to have their disabilities publicly disclosed in HRTO 
decisions will be deterred from seeking relief,176 just as the Supreme Court of Canada in Bragg 
found child victims of “online sexualized cyberbullying” were likely to be deterred from seeking 
a legal remedy in the absence of some form of confidentiality.177 Deterring claims by those who 
prefer not to disclose their disabilities arguably undermines their right to equal benefit and 
protection of the law in the same way that disclosure of the identities of sexual assault 
complainants without their consent triggers their equality rights, as found by the Supreme Court 
of Canada in Mills.178 
Notwithstanding concerns around HRTO practice in relation to disability and certain 
other grounds of discrimination, in situations where the HRTO does decide to order 
anonymization of its decisions, its reasons sometimes acknowledge the privacy/vulnerability 
cycle.  In GG v 1489024 Ontario Ltd, for example, the HRTO ordered anonymization in a case 
involving allegations of sexual harassment.179  Although Adjudicator Whist noted that the mere 
fact that “issues of a personal or sensitive nature” would not be enough to justify anonymization, 
he concluded that the case fell “within one of the exceptional situations” where anonymization 
was appropriate, citing a “risk of disclosure of highly sensitive information” in a case where the 
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 applicant had “already been subject to a sexual assault arising out of the facts that form the basis” 
for her complaint.180 
 
F. The Privacy/Vulnerability Cycle and Online Court Records: Commentary and 
Policy  
Policymakers have also articulated concerns about the privacy/vulnerability cycle in considering 
the implications of online accessibility of court records. In British Columbia, for example, the 
Provincial Court issued a direction to prevent remote online access to non-conviction 
information, stays of proceedings and peace bonds after specific periods of time.181 The direction 
specifically refers to submissions filed as part of a public consultation on the issue that illustrate 
the privacy/vulnerability cycle and unjust stigma arising from the use of non-conviction 
information to judge individuals’ suitability for jobs and rental accommodation.182 Justice Bielby 
of the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench expressed similar concerns about allowing “ready public 
access to the names of unconvicted accused” in Krushell, noting that:  
 
[s]tatutorily prescribed punishments for the convicted would pale in many cases in 
comparison to the de facto punishment created by posting [such] information… for the 
benefit of the gossip and the busybody.183 
 
In light of these concerns, the Court rejected an access to information request for disclosure of 
daily court dockets by an applicant who proposed to post them on the internet. Additionally, 
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 courts in BC and Alberta have chosen not to post certain kinds of decisions on their websites, 
such as those relating to family law, child protection and divorce,184 and, as noted above, family 
court records are not publicly accessible on BC’s CSO. 
The Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (“OPC”) has also issued access 
guidelines for federal tribunals governed by the Privacy Act185 with respect to addressing the 
privacy/vulnerability cycle aggravated by online access to court records noting: 
 
When personal information is made available on the Internet, individuals are at greater 
risk of identity theft, stalkers, data profilers, data miners and discriminatory practices; 
personal information can be taken out of context and used in illegitimate ways; and 
individuals lose control over personal information they may well have legitimately 
expected would be used for only limited purposes.186 
 
Additionally, the OPC has questioned whether “the broad public needs to know the names of 
individuals involved or requires access to intimate personal details through decisions posted 
widely on the internet”,187 expressing the view that “the right to open courts does not outweigh 
the right to privacy” so that both should exist in equilibrium.188 In line with these concerns, in 
2008, the OPC recommended that Service Canada should either depersonalize or post only 
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 summaries of the Office of the Umpire decisions on the internet, noting that these appeals related 
to personal information about employment insurance.189   
 Similarly, the Saskatchewan Information Privacy Commissioner (“IPC”) recommended 
that the Automobile Injury Appeal Commission mask the identity of applicants before posting 
their decisions online.190 Subsequently, the IPC’s 2004-5 annual report highlighted the connection 
between online disclosure of personal and health information and “such problems as identity 
theft, marketing opportunities, commercial data bases, personal safety of victims of domestic 
violence and stalking”.191 Ultimately, the Commission adopted a policy of using initials in its 
decisions.192  
 In 2005 the Canadian Judicial Council’s Judges Technology Advisory Committee issued 
its Model Policy for Access to Court Records in Canada.193 That policy stated that it did not 
endorse making all court records accessible online, and specifically adverted to the 
privacy/vulnerability cycle, noting that “new technologies increase the risks that court 
information might be used for improper purposes such as commercial data mining, identity theft, 
stalking, harassment and discrimination”.194 It recommended, among other things, that courts 
“prohibit the inclusion of unnecessary personal data identifiers and other personal information in 
the court record” and that judges avoid disclosure of personal data identifiers and limit disclosure 
of personal information in their judgments.195 It also recommended that judgments be made 
available online, but that steps be taken to prevent indexing and cache storage by online bots, so 
as to avoid searchability on general search engines like Google.196 
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  The privacy/vulnerability cycle and the special concerns it raises for members of 
equality-seeking communities in the context of online court records is sometimes explicitly, but 
more often implicitly, recognized in Canadian case law, legislation, court and tribunal rules and 
procedures, as well as in commentary from privacy commissioners and policy makers. While 
explicit reference to the cycle is more likely to surface in the context of specific vulnerable 
populations, including young people and sexual assault complainants (who are disproportionately 
likely to be women), it is occasionally also implicitly recognized in practices of anonymization in 
relation to decision making about members of other equality-seeking communities. These 
existing, albeit limited, acknowledgments of the privacy/vulnerability cycle, combined with 
concerns about widespread online dissemination and increasingly sophisticated data profiling 
techniques, provide a foundation and context ripe for reflecting on the relationship between 
privacy and equality and for developing effective measures to intervene in the 
privacy/vulnerability cycle. 
 
IV. Conclusion   
Although privacy at law has been abused by members of privileged groups to the disadvantage of 
less privileged groups, privacy, properly conceived, can also be intimately connected to 
autonomy, self-determination and collective social rights and values, like equality.197 As Calo has 
argued, members of marginalized communities are often accorded less privacy and subjected to 
greater surveillance, which in turn exacerbates their exposure to further discrimination and 
marginalization.198 The justice system frequently contributes to this “vicious cycle”, through the 
over-representation of members of marginalized communities in court proceedings either against 
their will or in order to contest or seek redress for the results of their marginalization. It need not, 
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 however, perpetuate the “vicious cycle” of privacy and vulnerability when it comes to public 
access to court records. This has been recognized (albeit to a very limited degree) in the context 
of certain vulnerable groups, particularly children and sexual assault complainants, as well as in 
other privacy-based limits imposed in relation to litigation.  And it need not, and should not, 
perpetuate that “vicious cycle” in the context of online public access to court records. 
Calo, in the epigraph, suggests that stronger protections for the chronically vulnerable 
may be in order. While we agree with the logic and moral appeal of this argument, specifying 
restrictions on online access to court records for chronically vulnerable communities raises at 
least three problems. First, identification of the “chronically vulnerable” seems to necessitate 
creation of hierarchies of vulnerability that, in light of the multiplicity of matrices of domination 
at play in the world,199 may neither be equality-enhancing or possible to do. Second, the 
identification process would have to be an ongoing one as the sources and grounds and 
intersections of vulnerability due to social location shift and reshape themselves. This would 
inevitably seem to leave certain marginalized communities vulnerable and exposed until such 
time as their plight was recognized by the courts and incorporated into some form of privacy-
protective, equality-enhancing measure. Third, as MacDonnell has pointed out, automatic 
“protections” for certain marginalized groups could serve to reinforce the stereotypes and 
discrimination against which they are intended to push back200 by uniquely depriving members of 
those groups the autonomy to determine whether they wish to conceal that information about 
themselves. 
For these reasons, and recognizing that there is no perfect solution, we return to the 
recommendation we put forward as a result of a prior analysis that specifically focused on the 
privacy issues relating to online public access to unredacted court records.201 There we proposed 
maintaining public access to court records in its current form (and subject to whatever limitations 
                                                        
199 See Patricia Hill Collins & Sirma Bilge, Intersectionality (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016).  
200 MacDonnell, supra note 2 at 144. 
201 Bailey & Burkell, supra note 2.  
 laws that rein in the open court principle allow), while “introducing appropriate ‘friction’ in the 
process of accessing court records” online.202 This could include redacting personal information 
from court records (including anonymizing judgments) before they are made accessible online, 
restricting search visibility and protecting access to documents.203   
 We recognize that this response goes further than necessary to intervene specifically on 
the privacy/vulnerability cycle because it provides a level of obscurity for both those who are 
members of equality-seeking groups and those who are not.  However, it offers two attractive 
outcomes. First, it does not presume that members of certain marginalized communities must 
want to conceal information about themselves because it is necessarily stigmatizing or something 
to be ashamed of. Instead it assumes that a certain level of concealment is important to the dignity 
of all persons in the context of easy and widespread access to digital records. Second, in making 
that assumption, it removes the costly onus of bringing a motion to displace a presumption of 
openness in a proceeding from the shoulders of a party seeking privacy protection. This aspect of 
our proposed response could be of particular benefit to individuals from marginalized 
communities who are unaware of the possibility of seeking such protections and/or who are not in 
a financial position to press for them before a court or tribunal. 
 
 
 
                                                        
202 Ibid at 182. 
203 Ibid at 181, referring to Woodrow Hartzog & Frederic D Stutzman, “Obscurity by Design” (2013) 88:2 
Washington Law Review 385. 
